Juncker's curse? Identity, interest and public support for the integration of core state powers*

Björn Bremer, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4629-1814)

Philipp Genschel, European University Institute, Florence

Markus Jachtenfuchs, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6484-7727)

Online appendix

A. Summary statistics
B. Additional bivariate plots (net support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building by interest and identity)
C. List of radical right parties by countries and descriptive results
D. Additional regression tables and predicted probability plots not shown in the main text
E. Robustness tests:
    - Regression results without survey weights
    - Regression results with additional control variables for Western Europe
    - Regression results with *opposition* to horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building as the dependent variable
F. Additional analyses with data from the Eurobarometer
G. Additional analysis of relationship between (perceived) interest and identity in our data

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented in Berlin (October 2018), Amsterdam (December 2018), Brussels (February 2019), Denver (May 2019) and Paris (June 2019). We thank all seminar participants as well as Jan Pieter Beetz, Paolo Graziano, Anton Hemerijck, Hanspeter Kriesi, Theresa Kuhn, Francesco Nicoli, Dimiter Toshkov, Sofia Wickberg, Pieter de Wilde, Cornelia Woll, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments.

Appendix A: Summary statistics of individual-level variables

Table A-1: Summary statistics of key independent and dependent variables from the YouGov survey

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Horizontal transfers (debt)	11,284	1.9	0.8	1	3
Horizontal transfers (unemployment)	11,284	1.8	0.8	1	3
Horizontal transfers (refugees)	11,284	1.7	0.8	1	3
Horizontal transfers (natural disasters)	11,284	1.3	0.7	1	3
Horizontal transfers (military attack)	11,284	2.6	1.4	1	5
Financial capacity building	11,284	2.7	1.1	1	4
Military capacity building	11,284	2.9	1.4	1	5
Radical populist right voter	11,284	0.1	0.3	0	1
EU fund	11,284	2.1	1.2	1	4
Age	11,284	46.8	15.7	18	91
Education	11,278	2.2	0.7	1	3
Gender	11,284	1.5	0.5	1	2

Appendix B: Additional bivariate plots (average net support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building by interest and identity)

Figure A-1: Average net support for horizontal transfers by interest and identity (other scenarios)



Note: The figure replicates Figure 3 from the main text for the other scenario not shown. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure A-2: Average net support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building with alternative variables for interest



Note: The figure replicates earlier graphs with an alternative measure for interest. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure A-3: Average net support for horizontal transfers by happiness about living in the EU



Note: The figure shows the country-level relationship between support for horizontal transfers and an alternative measure for identity. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure A-4: Average net support for vertical capacity building by happiness about living in the EU



Note: The figure shows the country-level relationship between support for vertical capacity building and an alternative measure for identity. Each graph includes a linear regression line and the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Appendix C: List of radical right parties by countries and descriptive results

We classify radical right-wing parties based on the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2018). However, we divert from the database in two cases by also classifying the Finns Party (formerly known as True Finns) in Finland and the Order and Justice Party (PTT) in Lithuania as parties of the radical populist right. We made this choice based on the literature (e.g. Mudde, 2007; Kriesi, 2015; Akkerman *et al.*, 2016) and membership in political groups of the European parliament that are mostly made up of other radical populist right parties (see Nicoli, 2017 for such an approach).

Table A-2: List of parties coded as radical populist right (RPR)

Country	Radical populist right party
Britain	UK Independence Party (UKIP)
France	Le Pen (Front National / Rassemblement National)
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DPP)
Finland	Finns Party, The Blue and White Front
Sweden	Sweden Democrats
Greece	Golden Dawn (XA)
Italy	Lega
Spain	n/a
Lithuania	Order and Justice (PTT)
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS)

Appendix D: Additional regression tables and predicted probability plots not shown in the main text

Table A-3: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries with interaction effects (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other parties)	-0.64***	-0.24*	-0.76***	-0.41**	-0.43***	0.31*	-0.36**
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Interest : net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.19**	0.23***	-0.07	-0.90***	0.12	0.04	0.16*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
= Balance	0.43***	0.51***	0.25***	-0.21*	-0.001	-0.15*	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Age	-0.003*	-0.002	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education							
= Medium	0.06	0.20***	0.41***	0.64***	0.26***	-0.11	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
= High	0.16*	0.44***	0.77***	0.97***	0.52***	0.02	0.26***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.20***	-0.14**	-0.04	0.08	-0.68***	-0.36***	-0.46***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Interaction (ref: contributor)							
= RPR Voter*Recipient	0.41*	-0.04	-0.13	0.10	0.11	-0.13	-0.03
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)
= RPR Voter*Balance	0.09	-0.45*	-0.26	-0.05	-0.14	-0.40	-0.09
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Constant	-0.81***	-0.91***	-0.65***	0.16	0.21*	-0.96***	-0.87***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Figure A-5: Predicted probability for supporting the integration of core state powers by identity and interest (other scenarios)



Note: The graph shows the predicted probabilities for supporting horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building as well as the corresponding 83 percent confidence intervals. Overlapping confidence intervals indicate that differences between two observations are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the absence of an overlap indicates the opposite. The plots for debt, refugees, financial capacity, and military capacity are shown in Figure 5 in the main text.

Appendix E: Robustness tests

To test the robustness of our regression analysis, we compute several alternative regression models: first, we run the same regressions from the main analysis without the survey weights provided by YouGov (Table A-4 and Table A-5); second, we use additional control variables, including marital status, children, and urban vs. rural, which we only have for six Western European countries, i.e. Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK (Table A-6 and A-7); and third, we use *opposition* to the integration of core state powers as the dependent variable instead of *support* (Table A-8 and A-9 and Figure A-6). The robustness tests generally support the findings reported in the main text.

Table A-4: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries (Logit regression, without survey weights)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-0.54***	-0.43***	-0.82***	-0.43***	-0.39***	0.06	-0.43***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Interest: net financial pos. (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.28***	0.23***	-0.13*	-1.07***	0.03	0.01	0.13*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
= Balance	0.46***	0.43***	0.13*	-0.40***	-0.01	-0.17*	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	-0.003*	-0.001	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.12	0.13	0.34***	0.39***	0.21**	-0.26**	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
= High	0.23**	0.35***	0.74***	0.71***	0.41***	-0.16*	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.23***	-0.13**	-0.02	0.09	-0.67***	-0.31***	-0.40***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.89***	-0.90***	-0.60***	0.39**	0.37***	-0.79***	-0.86***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214
Log Likelihood	-5,629.16	-5,774.41	-5,834.34	-3,515.69	-5,556.97	-4,305.44	-5,953.24
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,294.32	11,584.82	11,704.68	7,067.39	11,149.94	8,646.88	11,942.48

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-5: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries with interaction effects (Logit regression, without survey weights)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-0.62***	-0.38***	-0.78***	-0.59***	-0.46***	0.09	-0.48***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Interest: net financial pos. (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.26***	0.22***	-0.12	-1.12***	-0.01	-0.01	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
= Balance	0.45***	0.46***	0.14*	-0.43***	-0.01	-0.14	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	-0.003*	-0.001	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.12	0.13	0.35***	0.38***	0.21**	-0.26**	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
= High	0.23**	0.35***	0.74***	0.71***	0.40***	-0.16	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.23***	-0.13**	-0.02	0.09	-0.67***	-0.31***	-0.40***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Interaction (ref: contributor)							
= RPR Voter*Recipient	0.18	0.07	-0.06	0.38	0.34	0.11	0.18
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)
= RPR Voter*Balance	0.10	-0.26	-0.09	0.19	-0.04	-0.27	0.001
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.19)
Constant	-0.89***	-0.91***	-0.60***	0.41**	0.37***	-0.79***	-0.86***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214
Log Likelihood	-5,628.72	-5,773.13	-5,834.21	-3,514.28	-5,555.29	-4,304.25	-5,952.74
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,297.45	11,586.26	11,708.43	7,068.57	11,150.59	8,648.50	11,945.47

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-6: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in Western Europe (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-1.18***	-0.66***	-1.06***	-0.52**	-0.40**	-0.07	-0.50***
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Interest: net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.40***	0.30**	-0.39***	-1.64***	0.04	0.22	0.27*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)
= Balance	0.55***	0.41***	0.07	-0.77***	-0.17	-0.15	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Age	-0.01**	-0.003	0.003	0.02***	0.01**	-0.01***	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.07	0.09	0.38***	0.22	0.13	-0.53***	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
= High	0.36***	0.50***	0.90***	0.73***	0.49***	-0.40**	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.27***	-0.11	0.01	0.06	-0.66***	-0.36***	-0.49***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Married = Yes	-0.09	-0.07	0.04	-0.15	-0.02	-0.005	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Children = Yes	-0.01	0.003	-0.06	-0.05	0.03	0.14	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Urban = Yes	0.01	-0.01	0.10	-0.01	0.07	0.15	0.12
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Constant	-0.67***	-0.90***	-0.69***	0.77**	0.36*	-1.14***	-1.05***
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-7: Support for horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in Western Europe with interaction effects (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-1.12***	-0.54**	-1.10***	-0.66**	-0.40*	0.13	-0.48**
	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Interest: net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	0.40***	0.34**	-0.44***	-1.66***	0.03	0.32*	0.26*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)
= Balance	0.56***	0.42***	0.09	-0.81***	-0.16	-0.11	0.15
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Age	-0.01**	-0.003	0.003	0.02***	0.01**	-0.01***	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	0.07	0.09	0.38***	0.22	0.13	-0.53***	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
= High	0.36***	0.50***	0.90***	0.73***	0.49***	-0.40**	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.27***	-0.11	0.01	0.06	-0.66***	-0.35***	-0.49***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Married = Yes	-0.09	-0.07	0.05	-0.16	-0.02	-0.002	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Children = Yes	-0.01	0.004	-0.06	-0.05	0.03	0.14	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Urban = Yes	0.01	-0.01	0.10	-0.01	0.07	0.15	0.12
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Interaction (ref: contributor)							
= RPR Voter*Recipient	-0.11	-0.59	0.64	0.25	0.09	-0.98*	0.10
	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.38)
= RPR Voter*Balance	-0.17	-0.20	-0.29	0.40	-0.08	-0.35	-0.19
	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.41)	(0.34)
Constant	-0.67***	-0.91***	-0.69***	0.78**	0.36*	-1.15***	-1.05***
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556	4,556

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-8: Opposition to horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	0.69***	0.50***	0.88***	0.42***	0.50***	0.46***	0.50***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Interest: net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	-0.12	-0.07	0.09	1.01***	-0.02	0.09	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
= Balance	-0.53***	-0.55***	-0.23***	0.24*	0.03	-0.09	-0.21***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.002	0.001	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.005**	0.01***	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	-0.05	-0.14*	-0.29***	-0.65***	-0.24***	0.14*	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
= High	-0.07	-0.23***	-0.52***	-0.78***	-0.48***	0.17**	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.12**	-0.11*	-0.20***	-0.18*	0.39***	-0.33***	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.94***	-1.21***	-1.07***	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-9: Opposition to horizontal transfers and vertical capacity building in all countries with interaction effects (Logit regression)

	Horizontal transfer / Vertical capacity building						
	Debt	Unempl.	Refugees	Nat. dis.	Attack	Financial	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	0.79***	0.46***	0.91***	0.41*	0.47***	0.35**	0.53***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Interest : net financial position (ref: contributor)							
= Recipient	-0.07	-0.05	0.12	1.01***	-0.03	0.07	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
= Balance	-0.53***	-0.58***	-0.24***	0.23*	0.03	-0.12	-0.20**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.002	0.001	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.005**	0.01***	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)							
= Medium	-0.05	-0.14*	-0.29***	-0.65***	-0.24***	0.14*	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
= High	-0.06	-0.24***	-0.51***	-0.78***	-0.48***	0.17*	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.12**	-0.11*	-0.20***	-0.18*	0.39***	-0.34***	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Interaction (ref: contributor)							
= RPR Voter*Recipient	-0.41*	-0.12	-0.25	-0.04	0.12	0.20	-0.003
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)
= RPR Voter*Balance	0.001	0.36	0.15	0.10	0.02	0.27	-0.14
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Constant	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.94***	-1.21***	-1.06***	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214	9,214

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Figure A-6: Predicted probability for opposing the integration of core state powers by identity and interest

a) Horizontal transfers



b) Vertical capacity building



Note: The graph shows the predicted probabilities for opposing horizontal transfers or vertical capacity building as well as the corresponding 83 percent confidence intervals. Overlapping confidence intervals indicate that differences between two observations are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the absence of an overlap indicates the opposite.

Appendix F: Additional results with data from the Eurobarometer (Spring 2018)

The Eurobarometer survey from spring 2018 includes one question about attitudes towards a common European army. We use answers to this question as a robustness test for our analysis.

We repeat the exercise from part III and plot support for a European army on the country-level against the share of citizens that feel European (based on the Moreno question). The plot reveals that again there is no clear relationship between support for the integration of core state powers and identity.

Figure A-7: Support for a European army by identity



On the micro-level, we can also analyse the data by way of regression analysis. Below are the results from a logistic regression where the dependent variable is support to for a European army (1 = support, 0 = oppose or don't know).

Table A-10: Support for a European army (Logit regression)

	Vertical capacity building
	European army
European identity = Yes (ref: no)	0.17***
	(0.04)
Age	0.0002
	(0.001)
Education (ref: low)	
= Medium	0.04
	(0.16)
= High	-0.14
	(0.16)
Gender = Female (ref: male)	-0.36***
	(0.04)
Constant	-1.79***
	(0.19)
Country fixed effects	Yes
Observations	26,439
Log Likelihood	-9,206.69
Akaike Inf. Crit.	18,477.39
Note:	*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

The predicted probabilities for supporting a European army for individuals with a European identity and those without a European identity (as measured by the Moreno question) are shown in Figure A-8 below. The results indicate that the effect of European identity is small but significant: it is associated with a higher support for a European army, which supports our findings in the main text.

Figure A-8: Predicted probability for supporting a European army by identity (Moreno question)



Note: The graph shows the predicted probabilities for supporting a European identity by identity. Overlapping confidence intervals indicate that differences between two observations are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the absence of an overlap indicates the opposite.

Appendix G: Additional analysis of relationship between (perceived) interest and identity in our data

There is some reason to believe that interest and identity, as operationalized in our paper, are not independent. Rather, it is reasonable to assume that people who RPR voters are more likely to perceive their country as a net contributor than other individuals. However, on the aggregate level, our data does not confirm this hunch: voting for the radical populist right and viewing one's country as a net contributor is not correlated.

This is shown in Table 1, which shows how RPR voters view their country compared to all other voters. It indicates that in our sample among RPR voters 51.38 percent view their country as net contributors, while 55.20 percent of all other voters view their country as net contributor.

Table A-11: Perceived interest (net financial position) by identity (vote for the RPR)

Percentage	Other	RPR
Contributor	55.20	51.38
Recipient	21.84	24.51
Balance	22.96	24.11
Sum	100	100

This is also confirmed by a regression analysis, where the perceived creditor status (recoded into a binary variable) is the dependent variable. As model 1 from Table A-12 shows, RPR voters are not more or less likely to view their country as a net creditor. This is also visualised in the left panel of Figure A-9 below.

Moving beyond the simple binary regression analysis, however, changes the results: it shows that RPR voters are indeed more likely to view their country as a net creditor, controlling for age, education, gender, and differences across countries. As the right panel of Figure A-9 shows, the difference between the two groups is not large, though: RPR voters have a predicted probability to view their country as a net creditor of 0.86, while all other voters have a predicted probability of roughly 0.78.

Table A-12: Perceived interest and identity (Logit regression)

	Country perceived as net creditor	
	(1)	(2)
Identity: vote choice = RPR (ref: other party)	-0.10	0.50***
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Age		0.01***
		(0.002)
Education (ref: low)		
= Medium		0.03
		(0.03)
= High		-0.04
		(0.05)
Gender = Female (ref: male)		0.28*
		(0.11)
Country (ref: Great Britain)		
= Denmark		-0.39***
		(0.10)
= Finland		-1.14***
		(0.10)
= France		-0.54***
		(0.10)
= Germany		-2.58***
		(0.12)
= Greece		-1.85***
		(0.10)
= Italy		-2.56***
		(0.12)
= Lithuania		-2.71***
		(0.11)
= Poland		-2.31***
		(0.10)
= Spain		-0.04
		(0.11)
= Sweden	0.22***	0.93***
	(0.02)	(0.14)
Observations	9,216	9,213
Note:	*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001	

Figure A-9: Predicted probability for perceiving one's country as net creditor by identity

a) Binary analysis (model 1) **b) Multivariate analysis (model 2)**



References

Akkerman, T., Lange, S. L. de and Rooduijn, M. (2016) *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe : Into the Mainstream?* (Routledge).

Döring, H. and Manow, P. (2018) *Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies*.

Kriesi, H. (2015) *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession* (ECPR Press).

Mudde, C. (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge University Press).

Nicoli, F. (2017) 'Hard-Line Euroscepticism and the Eurocrisis: Evidence from a Panel Study of 108 Elections Across Europe: Hard-Line Euroscepticism and the Crisis'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 312–331.